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INTRODUCTION
A just polity requires two main features: the proper distribution of
governmental power within and among its political entities, and a pervasive
public virtue. The two are closely related. In an election year when both
features are being called into question in the U.S., this symposium could not
be more timely.
t Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
............ 1
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Not since the New Deal-perhaps not since the Civil War-have we so
thoroughly scrutinized and debated the institutions and practices of "our
federalism" (as the Supreme Court affectionately calls it).' Today, federalism
is being reconstructed in all branches and at all levels of government through
a variety of forms: statutes, administrative and judicial arrangements, court
decisions, and new private sector responsibilities.2
Broadly speaking, federalism can devolve power in two directions; it can
move public power downward to the states,3 and it can disperse power
outward to private actors. This "privatization"4 is often excluded from the
notion of federalism, yet there are sound analytic reasons to include it.
Downward devolution and outward privatization are not sharply distinct
categories. Instead, they overlap.5 Each is a potentially valuable instrument in
federalism's toolbox.
The federal government's authority in peacetime probably crested during
the energy crisis of the late 1970s. Even at its high water mark, however, the
national state apparatus remained radically incomplete, deeply contested, and
always vulnerable to retrenchment. Today, the public entertains serious doubts
about whether the national government can solve complex social problems. The
public believes, rightly or wrongly, that national solutions have already been
1. The Court used the phrase in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1970). Its provenance is
traced in Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of "Our Federalism, " 27 GA. L.
REv. 697 (1993).
2. Congress has already enacted some far-reaching reforms, including the unfunded mandates
legislation. Even more fundamental changes may reach the President's desk in the coming months. How
they will leave his desk, of course, is another matter. When the voters render their initial verdict on
these developments in November, the voxpopuli (or at least the vox that the politicians claim to hear)
will probably demand a slower pace and narrower scope in these changes.
3. States, in turn, may transfer some of this authority downward to their localities. This possibility
merits more public attention than it has so far received. For example, New York Governor George
Pataki has proposed devolving to the state's counties much of the authority over AFDC that he hopes
the state will receive from Congress.
4. Privatization can take a number of different forms. These include de-regulation, market-based
regulation, sale of governmental assets to private entities, cash or near-cash subsidies to consumers with
which they purchase privately-provided goods and services, contracting-out public services to private
providers, and others. See Ronald Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV.
449, 451-52 (1988).
5. Privatization, after all, is only one of many possible ways to decentralize governmental power.
When government decides to privatize, it is simply choosing to rely primarily on private incentives
rather than bureaucratic ones. The public goals of a privatization policy-liberty, diversity,
empowerment of sub-national communities, and pursuit of efficiency-are often the same ones that a
policy of downward devolution is intended to achieve. Both public decentralization and privatization
policies combine public and private initiatives, authorities, and resources. The precise mix of public and
private participation is always a central policy design question.
For certain purposes, one might wish to distinguish the privatization of existing governmental
authority from a social policy decision to allow activity that has not yet been "publicized" to remain in
the private sector. How such "non-publicization" differs-conceptually, normatively, and empirical-
ly-from the privatization of existing governmental authority is an interesting question. In the
increasingly liminal policy world in which public and private imperceptibly shade into one another, it
is also a very important one, but I shall not address it here.
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tried and that they have largely failed.6 Although the public's confidence in
state governments is only somewhat greater than its trust in Washington,7 we
can be certain that the states, once having retrieved authority, will not readily
relinquish it absent some grave, hard-to-foresee national emergency. The stakes
in the current federalism debate, therefore, are high indeed.
Most of the symposium papers focus on specific legal and policy
domains-environmental regulation, welfare policy, torts, and individual
rights-as well as exploring some theoretical perspectives on federalism. The
papers consider how, why, and with what consequences devolution is occurring
in so many areas. This introduction will look across (and peer beneath) these
particular domains, identifying some common themes and developments that
the welter of detailed, policy-specific analysis might otherwise obscure.
My argument can be briefly stated. Many policy elites regard the current
federal system, which entrenches broad state authority that competes with the
national government for resources and legitimacy, as a case of arrested political
development, a kind of pulmonary embolism in the body politic. To them,
federalism is an anachronistic relic of an ancient and unjust constitutional
order; it is the institutional vestige of a localism long since marginalized by the
emergence of a modem and universalizing culture based on mass education, a
vast suburbanized middle class, and a popular culture shaped by national media
and technologies. In this view, federalism today lacks normative justification
and impedes the full realization of a strong and effective national polity.
I believe that these policy elites-who include most liberal activists and
many Washington-oriented analysts and prestigious academics-are wrong.
6. For the view that this loss of public confidence is simply a temporary, cyclical phenomenon, see
generally E.J. DIONNE, JR., THEY ONLY LOOK DEAD: WHY PROGRESSIVES WILL DOMINATE THE NExr
POLITICAL ERA (1995). I regard this as wishful thinking. Any concessions to states' rights now will be
difficult to dislodge in the future.
7. According to a recent joint survey by the Washington Post, Harvard University, and the Kaiser
Family Foundation, while in 1964 three in four Americans trusted the federal government all or most
of the time, today only one in four does so. This change is part of a more general decline in Americans'
trust-in one another and in our institutions. Richard Morin & Dan Balz, Americans Losing Trust in
Each Other and Institutions, WASH. PoSr, Jan. 28, 1996, at Al. The respondents indicated a higher
level of trust in state governments, a finding that apparently is consistent with other surveys. See Eric
Schmitt, Senate Approves Bill to Phase Out Farming Subsidies, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 1996, at Al
("Many public opinion surveys show that people have more trust in state government than in the Federal
Government.") (quoting Professor Larry Sabato).
8. It is striking in this regard that public law scholars at elite law schools (often described,
accurately and tellingly, as "national" institutions) show little interest in state law, politics, and culture.
For example, administrative law courses at these schools and the leading casebooks focus almost entirely
on federal agencies. The vast body of state administrative law goes largely unmentioned. On this point,
see Peter H. Schuck, Introduction, in FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISRATIVE LAW 6 (Peter H. Schuck ed.,
1994). Much the same is true with respect to constitutional law. Courses in local government law are
largely concerned with the general principles that govern municipal organization, finance, and
regulation. Apparently, only one law school program in the U.S. focuses on the law of a particular
locality. Telephone Conversation with Prof. Ross Sandler, Director, Center on New York City Law,
New York Law School, Feb. 23, 1996.
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The "genius" (as it was formerly called) of federalism was once an article of
national faith confidently proclaimed by politicians and professors across the
land, but beginning in the 1930s several events cast dark shadows over this
traditional piety. The Depression severely tested it, the South's massive
resistance to Brown v. Board of Education savagely mocked it, and the Great
Society and Nixon eras interred it under a mountain of nationalizing policy
initiatives. Federalism had nourished some of America's most repellent and
repressive political regimes, most notably in the deep South: lynchings
tolerated if not abetted by state officials, governors barring black children from
entering public schools, Bull Connor's dogs attacking civil rights demonstrators
in Alabama, widespread poverty and disease in the Mississippi Delta, corrupt
and insular Bourbon courthouse machines. These harsh images of federalism
are fixed in our minds like insects caught in amber.9
But whatever injustices federalism worked in the past, it is a very different
system today. Neither the federal government nor the states are even remotely
what they were during the civil rights era, when many of our strongest
impressions of the federal system were first formed."° Federalism now serves
both as an instrument of the modern administrative state and as a rather flexible
institutional accommodation to the extraordinary diversity of American society
and to the challenges that this diversity poses for national unity. This diversity-
accommodating aspect of federalism receives too little attention from
commentators. Although inter-state differences help to explain federalism's
remarkable durability, we still lack a determinative theory-constitutional
considerations aside-for deciding which of those differences the federal
government should tolerate or encourage and which of them it should limit or
override altogether. We are left in the fluid and highly compromised realm of
normal politics where, for at least the next few years, the system is likely to
accord greater deference to inter-state differences and less weight to the value
of national uniformity.
9. Wade Henderson, director of the Washington office of the NAACP, recently stated: "Many
African-Americans remember that 'states' rights' were code words for the states' denial of basic civil
rights. We are concerned that this history not return in the context of welfare reform." Robert Pear,
Governors' Plans on Welfare Attacked, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 14, 1996, at A12. Hostility to federalism,
moreover, is not confined to liberals and blacks-and certainly not to Americans. Nationalizing elites
in most countries fear that federalism and the social diversity that it protects and reinforces are state-
fragmenting conditions that only the centralization of power can cure. Even the leaders of a country like
Canada, with its strong federalist tradition, fear that its national unity is now in jeopardy. E.g., Charles
Truehart, It's Official, Canada Adrift on Quebec, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1996, at A15. For other
examples of nation-states grappling with the challenge of diversity, see generally DONALD L.
HOROWITZ, ETNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985). Some of Horowitz's examples, such as Nigeria, have
since opted for more authoritarian solutions.
10. On changes in the states, see generally CARL VAN HORN, THE STATE OF THE STATES (3d ed.,
1996); LARRY SABATO, GOODBYE TO GOOD-TIME CHARLIE: THE AMERICAN GOVERNOR TRANS-
FORMED, 1950-1975 (2d ed., 1983). On changes in the federal government, see generally THE NEW
POLITICS OF PUBLIC POLICY (Marc K. Landy & Martin A. Levin eds., 1995).
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American federalism, like our politics and society more generally, has
evolved in a generally progressive direction during the last thirty to forty
years." In noting this generally reformist tendency, of course, I do not mean
to praise it in all of its particulars. We surely would have had to invent a
robust federal system if our Constitution and subsequent political development
had not bequeathed one to us, but we just as surely would have designed it
very differently. The present configuration of state jurisdictions has little to
recommend it besides historical pedigree; our political map was drawn with
blood and iron, not by experts in public administration. The existing allocation
of responsibilities among the different levels of government is irrational in
many respects.'1
2
Still, history, pragmatic compromise, and our remarkable social diversity
have their just claims on our political structures and practices. If federalism is
far from being an ideal system, it nevertheless remains a great source of social
strength and political cohesion that help to bind a congeries of disparate
peoples to the nation by accommodating their passionately parochial interests.
It is also a system that more severely divided societies would do well to
emulate, albeit in their own fashions.
My paper develops this argument by exploring five themes or developments
that bear on contemporary federalism: (1) the pervasiveness of devolution in the
U.S.; (2) devolution's global character; (3) the growing social diversity that
is devolution's driving force; (4) the complex relationship between technologi-
cal change and devolution; and (5) the cognitive demands on government
created by the federal system. The analysis is neither systematic nor rigorous;
I employ neither overarching theory nor refined analytical framework. My
purpose here is not to prove hypotheses but to frame and provoke the
discussion that will follow at this symposium.
I. THE PERVASIVENESS OF DEVOLUTION
The pressure to devolve power from the center to the periphery is a nearly
universal phenomenon in contemporary society. It is by no means confined to
the political sphere; indeed, it is proceeding far more rapidly and irreversibly
in the economic and social realms. Although status quo interests almost always
resist devolution and often succeed in delaying or defeating it, the pressures to
devolve power in complex social systems are relentless. This is true whether
those pressures are driven by efficiency goals, concerns about protecting
liberty, or communitarian ideals. In a democracy, the devolutionary impulse
11. I support this claim in the concluding section of Peter H. Schuck, Alien Ruminations, 105 YALE
L.J. 1963 (1996) (book review).
12. For an extended argument on this point, see generally PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF
FEDERALISM (1995).
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inevitably extracts important concessions from the center. Even in the most
totalitarian regime, this impulse manages to find informal, symbolic, and
clandestine outlets for rebellion and diversity. 3
A. Devolution by the Federal Government
Under one banner or another, the assertion of states' rights has been a
central political motif in the U.S. throughout our long, spasmodic process of
national consolidation. At the same time, a citizenry perennially suspicious of
private concentrations of economic power demanded national political
institutions capable of controlling it.' Mass education,.mass media, and mass
mobility disseminated more cosmopolitan values and created something like a
common national culture. Recurrent wars and international and economic crises
spawned large, professional bureaucratic establishments.
These developments all strengthened the hand of those forces calling for a
more active central state. Nevertheless, they also generated a strong backlash
against the new cosmopolitanism. Powerful counter-cultural movements, which
appealed to the deep populist strains long endemic in American life, firmly
rejected the new cosmopolitanism-and its reified political apparatus in
Washington-in favor of more parochial, differentiated cultures and politics.
As I discuss below, demographic and technological changes have accelerated
this cultural fragmentation, increasing the demand for a federal structure
capable of fully representing this diversity. All branches and levels of
government have responded to this demand in diverse public policy domains.
The practice of outward devolution by the federal government to the private
sector has been even more important than downward devolution to the
states."5 Since the late 1970s, Congress has privatized numerous activities and
entities that were once federally regulated or owned. The most significant
examples are the transportation industry, whose air and surface modes are now
largely free of federal regulation, and the telecommunications industry, which
was substantially deregulated in January 1996. The sale of Conrail, the
growing use of market-based incentives in regulation under the Clean Air Act
and other laws, and the auctioning of certain federally-regulated communication
13. The literature on the day-to-day experiences of those living, working, and governing in
communist states is rich with examples of such low-visibility outlets. Two classics in this genre are
MILAN KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING (Michael H. Heim trans., 1984), and
ALEKSANDER SOLZHENITSYN, ONE DAY IN THE LIFE OF IVAN DENISOVICH (Gilon Aitken trans., 1970).
14. See generally THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLmcAL
ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW
AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982).
15. Privatization is a global phenomenon. See generally Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-
Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 223 (1995).
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spectra are additional instances. As noted immediately below, privatization of
at least portions of public pension systems may also be on the policy horizon.
B. Devolution by Congress
Congress, of course, is leading this decentralizing project. The President
has now signed a far-reaching reform of the AFDC program that will give the
states much greater policymaking authority over eligibility criteria, benefit
levels, and other programmatic elements, as well as enlarged administrative
responsibilities.1 6 Congress is also more receptive to proposals to distribute
benefits through vouchers or similar near-cash techniques. This receptivity even
extends to programs like Medicare and Social Security pensions in which the
states have played little or no policy or fiscal role. Some of these proposals,
which are likely to receive growing support, would effect devolution through
privatization.17 In other policy areas such as manpower training, education,
and transportation, Congress has moved toward block grants and looser
restrictions on other levels of government. Finally, Congress enacted legislation
in 1995 to eliminate future unfunded federal mandates to state and local
governments.
C. Devolution by the Executive Branch
The executive branch has initiated downward devolution of its own. During
the 1980s and 1990s, agencies have used their administrative authority to
delegate more policy responsibility to their state and local counterparts. The
Reagan and Bush Administrations, although often stymied in their "new
federalism" initiatives by Democratic congresses, did manage to consolidate
some categorical programs, to reduce regulatory restrictions in certain areas,
and otherwise to enlarge state discretion. Despite criticism from the left, the
Clinton Administration has continued such efforts, which include a permissive
use of the waiver authority under section 1115 of the Social Security Act to
allow states to experiment with changes in AFDC, Medicaid, and child welfare
policies.18
16. See Robert Pear, Senate Passes Welfare Measure, Sending it for Clinton's Signature, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1996, at Al. The extent to which they will also receive or raise the funds necessary to
discharge these new welfare program responsibilities, of course, is a more doubtful matter. The Food
Stamp program, at least for the near term, will retain its current structure of uniform national standards
and funding, albeit at lower benefit levels. The federal-state shared responsibility for Medicaid has not
been significantly changed in the law.
17. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Plan to Put Part of Social Security into Stock Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
17, 1996, at Al.
18. See generally U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/HEHS-96-44, MEDICAID SECTION 1115
WAIVERS: FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO APPROVING DEMONSTRATIONS COULD INCREASE FEDERAL COSTS
(1995) (summarizing waiver projects). On the other side, the right has criticized the administration for
resisting certain state innovations, including some of Wisconsin's more radical reforms. See Robert
Pear, Clinton Wavers After Backing Welfare Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1996, at Al.
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D. Devolution by the Federal Courts
Even the federal courts have become downward devolutionists. Judicial
deference to local preferences has taken several different forms. Procedurally,
they have encouraged the federal judicial districts to experiment with local
rules in order to promote more efficient modes of civil discovery and case
management. 19 Doctrinally, they have reaffirmed the continuing centrality of
state law even in nationwide mass tort litigation,1° Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause jurisprudence,21 constitutional torts,' and much federal product
safety regulation.' The Supreme Court has also recently limited federal
power to exercise authority even in areas in which Congress has asserted a
national interest.U
E. Devolution by the States
The states, too, have increasingly embraced both downward and outward
devolution. Changes in public education, perhaps the most politically explosive
area of state-provided services, are especially revealing of the dynamics of
contemporary federalism. As in the past, New York City may be the leading
edge of reform. The city is moving to decentralize regulatory authority in
personnel and other educational policy areas to the individual school level, thus
by-passing, and perhaps eliminating altogether, the large-district community
boards.' The state, however, can only effectuate this radical devolution of
power by first re-centralizing it.
The devolution of education policymaking takes other forms as well. A
number of states have created so-called "charter schools," which may be
operated by independent public or private entities. Such schools, which may
receive public funds, operate with great autonomy, free of local school board
controls.? Wisconsin and some other states have authorized pilot programs,
19. See, e.g., Title I of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 5089, 5089-98.
20. See generally LINDA S. MULLENIX, MASS TORT LrIGATION (1995) (ch. 3).
21. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (suggesting that state
nuisance law has traditionally guided determinations of when state governments may effect regulatory
takings without compensation).
22. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1989).
23. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct.___, 64 U.S.L.W. 4625 (1996).
24. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1119 (1996); United States v.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632-33 (1995) (striking down, on Commerce Clause grounds, statute making
possession of firearms near schools federal crime). Some other decisions have used narrowing statutory
interpretations to accomplish this limitation. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169-
70 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464-67 (1991). For a recent review of these and other
of the Court's federalism decisions, see Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's
"Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1447 (1995).
25. Joseph Berger, Board of Education:A Thing ofthe Past?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1996, at A39.
26. Peter Applebome, Start of Charter School Shows Flaws in Concept, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1996,
at B9 (reporting that as of December 1995, twenty states had authorized charter schools).
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soon to be expanded (but also under court challenge), that enable children to
use state-funded vouchers to pay private school tuition.
An increasingly common and far-reaching form of state-level privatization
is for states to devolve extensive powers of self-government to common-interest
housing developments governed by homeowner associations.27 In an instance
of sub-state level devolution, New York City has delegated to privately-run
"business improvement districts" a broad range of authority to provide
important municipal services to businesses and residents and to impose tax-like
user fees for those services. 28
F. Devolution Within the Private Sector
Decentralization by for-profit enterprises is of special interest because the
way in which private firms internally organize their resources often prefigures
change, mutatis mutandis, in the slower-moving public sector. Since 1980, the
most notable trend in industrial organization has been the practice by large
integrated enterprises of replacing highly-centralized management structures
with looser, more decentralized ones organized around market-driven, multi-
skill, flexible production and localized profit centers. Within the firm, authority
structures and resource allocations are increasingly determined by the dictates
of time- and cost-efficient information flows and market incentives, rather than
by formal corporate ownership patterns.2 9 The recent organizational transfor-
mations of AT&T, IBM, and many other industrial giants represent desperate
efforts to meet the challenges posed by more nimble, market-responsive
competitors. Their strategies include many elements of downward and outward
devolution: breakup into smaller units; delegation of initiative and policymak-
ing to lower-level, more market-sensitive employees; tactical out-sourcing; and
elimination of middle management layers.
11. THE GLOBAL CHARACTER OF DEVOLUTION
There is much talk today about the demise of the nation-state.3" Many
commentators claim (and ardently hope) that traditional notions of national
27. See generally EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT (1994); Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and HomeownerAssociations,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982).
28. On business improvement districts, see Thomas Lueck, Owners Challenging Business District,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1995, at Bi. The voting rules for the governance of such districts are under
challenge. See Kessler v. Grand Central Partnership, 95 Civ. 10029 (SAS) (filed S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28,
1995).
29. See, e.g., ARNALDO BAGNOSCO & CHARLES F. SABEL, SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED
ENTERPRISES (1995); MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE
(1984).
30. See generally KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL
ECONOMIES (1995); Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards A
People-Centered Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 1 (1993).
Constructing a New Federalism
sovereignty are being rendered increasingly artificial by the growing integration
of the world economy, the rise of transnational legal regimes, the spillover
effects of environmental pollution, the irrelevance of national borders to
massive immigration flows, and the need for international cooperation to
control the dangerous conduct of rogue states. Proponents of this view cite the
creation during the post-World War II era of numerous supra-national entities
to coordinate international trade regimes, collective security arrangements,
environmental accords, and political cooperation. They point to the European
Union, which integrates all of these purposes into a multi-state structure that
even provides for a supranational "European citizenship."
In fact, however, the nation-state is not only flourishing but proliferating,
and it is devolution, the essence of federalism, that is reinvigorating it. One
kind of global devolution-indeed one of the greatest devolutions in world
history-has occurred in the wake of the sudden dissolution of the Soviet
empire. Like the breakup of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, British, and
French empires earlier in this century, this event has spawned a profusion of
new (or long-suppressed) entities extending in a broad arc from the Baltic and
Central and Eastern Europe through Central Asia.
These entities, which claim a nation-state status that is often precarious or
even fictive, in turn face devolutionary pressures from their own ethnic and
religious minorities. The emergent states of the former Yugoslavia, the
Chechnyan uprising against Russia, and insurgencies in a number of African
states provide vivid examples of this phenomenon. The forces of devolution
also stalk more well-entrenched prey, roiling long-established nation-states like
Canada and Mexico; even strong states like the U.K., Spain, and Belgium are
vulnerable to the militant demands of separatist movements. In order to
survive, such nation-states must either suppress their minorities, which is
difficult for democratic regimes (or even authoritarian ones) to do, or adopt a
form of federalism or more modest power-sharing arrangement. The American
states' demand for devolution, therefore, is part of a global zeitgeist. The
powerful centrifugal forces exerted by diversity are propelling this change.
A second type of global devolution is actually the result of aborted or
incomplete supranational projects. The most important example, of course, is
the European Union after the (at least temporary) failure of Maastricht. Its
gradual expansion-from the customs union created by the Treaty of Rome to
common market to regional residency and work zone to the guarantee of voting
rights in local (and EU) elections-proceeded without major interruption until
the early 1990s and culminated in the Maastricht accords. Unmistakable danger
signals, however, had already appeared. When the Dublin and Schengen
agreements sought to fashion a common immigration, refugee, and border
control policy, a number of EU members refused to accede.
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The European currency and common monetary policies envisioned by
Maastricht are proving elusive. Some of the most powerful EU states have
serious reservations about both timing and feasibility, and even Germany is
faltering. They foresee the loss of autonomy, political risks, and short-term
economic dislocations that a common monetary policy will entail. They also
fear enhancing the more general authority of the central EU bureaucracy.
Just as "Washington" has become a readily serviceable, all-purpose
political epithet deployed by those who are dissatisfied with national policies
and demand the devolution of power to the states, so "Brussels" is now a
rhetorical metaphor for meddlesome bureaucratic empire-building, corrosive
cosmopolitanism, and insidious challenges to national sovereignty. Devolu-
tion-the effort to retrieve powers now exercised by Brussels, and the refusal
to grant new ones-is among the most significant political currents in Europe
today. Across the Atlantic, complaints about NAFTA-more strident during the
presidential campaign-are echoing this devolutionary credo, but with an
American accent.
III. DIVERSITY AND DEVOLUTION
The Founders, as Samuel Beer reminds us, contrived a constitutional
system of federalism in the hope of advancing three fundamental civic virtues:
liberty, community, and utility.31 But they did not write on a clean slate. They
designed their federal system for a society that was geographically far-flung
and, especially by the standards of the day, remarkably heterogeneous in
demographic, religious, linguistic, cultural, and political terms. The dynamics
and distribution of settlement during the colonial period had assured that the
emerging civil society, once united in a national polity, would exhibit an
unprecedented diversity." The states, and the federal system that both
reflected and reinforced the states' political identities and social cultures, are
the institutional expressions of this diversity.
The characteristic of America that has most struck its more acutely
perceptive visitors across the centuries is the polyglot, eclectic, improvisational
character of its civil society. This diversity, which is greater today than ever
before, has many sources and dimensions but it ultimately rests on demograph-
ic foundations. Demographic heterogeneity entails cultural differentiation,
which in turn spawns many other, more meaningful differences. The
heterogeneities of ethnicity, language, and national origins that are such
striking features of contemporary American society are a direct consequence
of recent immigration patterns and a pluralistic political culture that toler-
31. See generally SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM (1993).
32. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE PEOPLING OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA (1986).
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ates-and in some ways encourages-the maintenance (in some forms) of these
differences.
The post-1965 migration flow to the U.S. has little in common with the
pre-1965 flows that created the still-dominant population stock. One example
will suffice to make the point: in 1965, there were barely one million Asian-
Americans; by 1990 the total had increased more than sevenfold, to 7.3
million-or almost 3 % of the U.S. population. The Asian-American grouping,
moreover, consists of numerous subgroups-Chinese, Filipino, Japanese,
Indian, Korean, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian, and others-with different
languages, cultures, socioeconomic profiles, and experiences in the U.S.33
Much the same is true for some of the other ethnic groupings now constituted
by the U.S. Census.34
The U.S. is also the most religiously diverse nation in the world. It is not
simply that the world's religious traditions, great and small, are all well
represented here. It is also that each of the main religious group-
ings-Christian, Jewish, Islamic, Hindu, and Buddhist-contains confessional
sub-groups that are bewildering in their variety. They differ from one another
liturgically, doctrinally, organizationally, demographically, and in their
geographic distributions. This religious diversity also is a function of immigra-
tion patterns. Immigrants who brought with them quite different cultural,
linguistic, and confessional traditions found it desirable to establish churches
here that were parochial in those senses. Thus, Catholic immigrants from
France, Bavaria, Italy, Puerto Rico, and South America preferred to worship
with co-religionists from the old country.
The fierce dissenting ethos of American Protestantism, refined through
almost four centuries of struggle and fragmentation, is a powerful and
independent cause of religious diversity that has precipitated a vast number of
Protestant denominations and sects. Even the non-Protestant religions in the
U.S. have been profoundly influenced by these fractionating pressures.
American Judaism, for example, has split into at least four streams, most of
which have no real counterparts among Jews in other countries. Such
centrifugal tendencies are by no means confined to liberal, congregational
groups. They extend as well to the more hierarchical Catholic and Orthodox
churches and the rapidly growing evangelical sects. In most cases, the
churches' worshipers, liturgies, and other practices in the U.S. are far more
33. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Immigration Brings NewDiversity toAsian Population in the U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1991, at Al. See generally YEN LE ESPIuTU, ASIAN AMERICAN PANETHNICrrY:
BRIDGING INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTIES (1992). As a result of immigration's demographic effects, the
U.S. population is also younger than other leading industrial nations-another diversity-enhancing
attribute.
34. I say "constituted by the U.S. Census" in recognition of the utter artificiality of some of these
groupings.
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heterogeneous than they are anywhere else in the world. This religious
diversification, moreover, continues. For every church amalgamating with
others today, many more are born afresh or separate from parent congrega-
tions.
This American diversity also possesses a strong regional aspect. States (and
the regions in which they cluster) differ in many important ways, not just
superficial ones like accents, dress, and sports team allegiances. It is this
regional heterogeneity that our political institutions in general, and the system
of federalism in particular, were meant to respect and preserve. The states are
distinct from one another with respect to most of the variables that affect and
thus differentiate their political behavior: wealth, public services, cultural
institutions, age, distribution and urbanization of the population, economic
development, climate, ethnic and religious patterns, partisan division, political
structure, style and culture, and the like. The pronounced residential
concentration of new, culturally diverse immigrants in a small number of
metropolitan areas magnifies this regional distinctiveness.35 Many local
communities in the more internally diverse states exhibit a similar distinctive-
ness.
Diversity among the states might seem artificial given the fact that their
existing boundaries were established for a number of historical reasons that had
precious little to do with the kinds of economic and other factors that a
rational, omnipotent institutional designer seeking to craft a just and efficient
federal system would emphasize today. But these state-forging circumstances,
however historically contingent, left their indelible marks on the populations
of the different states. By now, each state possesses a distinctive social
character and political culture.36
These local distinctions turn out to be remarkably durable. Two examples
drawn from the politically-salient area of health policy-one relating to
professional standards, the other to individual behavior-will illustrate the
point. Medical education, specialty certification, technology, product
marketing, research, and (increasingly) legal standards of care are highly
national in character. Even so, local diversities dominate. When providers have
more than one option for treating a medical condition, the treatment they use
and the prices they charge vary enormously from region to region. Moreover,
these regional differences persist even after one controls for differences in
35. The top six states of intended residence for immigrants in 1993 accounted for over 70% of
immigrants admitted that year. This pattern of concentration has continued since 1971. 1993
STATISTICAL Y.B. IMMIGR. NATURALIZATION SERV. 21-22. New immigrants also are beginning to settle
in significant numbers even in ethnically homogeneous "heartland" communities. See Steven A. Holmes,
In Iowa Town, Strains of Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1996, at 6.
36. This diversity is perhaps most apparent during the presidential primary season, when political
and media commentators have occasion to call special attention to it.
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medical resources, insurance, and other such factors. Persistent region-specific
professional cultures overwhelm the strong pressures for national uniformi-
ty°3
7
Sharp inter-state differences in health status and individual behaviors also
persist. In his book Who Shall Live?, economist Victor Fuchs notes that the
contiguous states of Nevada and Utah states enjoy roughly the same levels of
income, schooling, urbanization, climate, and resources devoted to medical
care, and are alike in many other respects as well, yet "their levels of health
differ enormously. The inhabitants of Utah are among the healthiest individuals
in the United States, while the residents of Nevada are at the opposite end of
the spectrum."38 Fuchs attributes these disparate health outcomes to life style
differences-not only tobacco and alcohol consumption but also marital status
and geographical stability linked to religious beliefs and practices.39
Such persistent differences constitute the distinctive engine and problematic
of federalism. Different states' inhabitants exhibit famously divergent public
attitudes and policy preferences on a wide variety of policy issues. This is true
whether the policy domain is one over which the states enjoy broad discretion
with respect to funding levels and programmatic content (such as AFDC,
Medicaid, and public education), 4" one in which the states' role is highly
constrained by federal prerogatives (such as the treatment of immigrants),41
or one in which the federal government expressly seeks to reduce or eliminate
state-to-state and locality-to-locality inequalities (such as compensatory
education and food stamps).
The political acceptability of these inequalities in states' spending and
program characteristics, which reflect variations in their tax bases and in their
citizens' values, is of course a core issue in the federalism debate. Those who
advocate greater uniformity hope to override these differences in pursuit of the
nationalist, egalitarian ideals that have dominated modem American political
discourse but that have never been fully accepted or institutionalized.
37. Gina Kolata, Sharp Regional Incongruities Found in Medical Costs and Treatments, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 1996, at C3.
38. VICTOR R. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE?: HEALTH, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL CHOICE 52 (1974).
39. Id. at 52-54.
40. See data in PETERSON, supra note 12, at 44.
41. Nathan Glazer, for example, recently has shown that Massachusetts is far more attentive to the
interests of immigrants, both legal and illegal, than is Texas. Nathan Glazer, Governmental and
Nongovernmental Roles in the Absorption of Immigrants in the United States, in PATHS TO INCLUSION:
THE INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY (P. Schuck et al. eds.,
forthcoming 1997). Texas, in turn, is viewed in another comparison as being more solicitous than
California. Scott McCartney and Karen Blumenthal, Texas Strives to Avoid California's Mistakes, and
It Is Prospering, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1995, at Al; see also PETER SKERRY, MEXICAN AMERICANS:
THE AMBIVALENT MINORITY (1993) (arguing that Mexican immigrants and Mexican-Americans have
made more progress in San Antonio, Texas, where they have faced greater racial discrimination, than
in Los Angeles, California, where they have faced less).
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Devolutionists, in contrast, regard inter-state differences as benign, even
desirable; they wish to accord them full, or at least fuller, expression.
But however this debate is resolved, the normative question will remain.
Some differences among states reflect citizens' deeply-held values or important
local interests that they want their policymakers to affirm and preserve, while
others are more expendable. Which inter-state differences are so normatively
compelling that the federal government must countenance their continuation
rather than suppress them in the interest of national uniformity?
To this central question, the Constitution provides only a partial answer.
It bars the federal government from overriding inter-state differences that are
protected by the Bill of Rights, that do not affect interstate commerce, or that
other structural limitations on national power immunize. For the rest, however,
the Constitution leaves the question to be resolved in the pulling and hauling
of normal politics. Even in this realm, to be sure, a quasi-constitutional
background norm holds that the federal government should tolerate inter-state
differences unless there is a compelling reason to override them.42 Still, this
is no more than a default rule, a rebuttable presumption. The fundamental
normative question remains: Which conditions will suffice to rebut this
presumption of state diversity?
This question is especially difficult because in principle, and sometimes in
fact, each level of government-federal, state, and local-is capable of
protecting diversity values. The ability and willingness of a particular level to
do so depend primarily on the nature of the conflict that the diverse interests
implicate and on the political and legal cultures which prevail at that level.
Small racial and religious minorities, for example, can often receive greater
legal protection at the federal level than at the state level.43 A concern for
diversity, therefore, does not always justify devolution. Indeed, as the case of
civil rights enforcement famously demonstrates, such a concern may justify
entrusting the primary authority and responsibility to the center.
Still, there should be at least one easy answer to the question of which state
differences the federal government should be able to suppress: it should reduce
those differences which, if permitted to be the subject of inter-state competi-
tion, will engender a so-called "race to the bottom." This answer might seem
to be an easy one because such a race, by its very nature, would undermine
both local and national values. For reasons that I discuss below, however,
neither the race-to-the-bottom theory nor criteria such as allocative or
42. Traditionally, this norm was quite widely accepted. Between 1960 and the early 1990s,
however, it weakened considerably. In the current Congress, it has again become robust.
43. The heightened constitutional protection accorded to "discrete and insular minorities" under the
Carolene Products standard is an example. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938). Likewise, state constitutional rights are premised on the notion that individuals can often
expect greater protection at the state than at the local level.
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governmental "efficiency" can resolve the suppression-by-difference question.
After all, the federalism debate directly implicates competing conceptions of
nationhood, and the efficiency criterion begs most of the important issues.
IV. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
If the diversity of American life leaves us uncertain about how we should
treat inter-state differences, technology-by facilitating the expression of those
differences-is deepening this normative indeterminacy. In this way technology
is raising the stakes in a federal system designed, among other purposes, to
give diversity political and institutional form.
Technology's precise effects on diversity are complex and changing, hence
still poorly understood. In part, this is because technology triggers multiple and
competing effects on diversity that we can scarcely glimpse today, much less
evaluate. Although some of these changes might work to homogenize our
culture and make centralized authority more palatable to the public, technology
also enhances social diversity. Civil libertarian fears notwithstanding, past
predictions of technology-based authoritarian control in the U.S. have proved
as exaggerated as they are common. New technologies promise to enlarge
individual choice, redefine social relationships, and transform markets in ways
that will encourage individuals and groups to express existing diversities and
to cultivate new ones. Although these changes will not necessarily produce a
more desirable society-more choices do not always yield better ones-a
responsive federalism must strive to reflect and integrate the resulting
diversities.
Many of the most important social effects of technology are quite
unexpected, even to their creators. Three examples-air conditioning,
television, and computers-will illustrate the point.
Air conditioning transformed American politics and society by making
many areas of the country attractive to individuals and businesses that
otherwise would not have located there." It encouraged a vast population shift
in the U.S. in which millions of Americans, many of them retirees and young
adults from northern and midwestern states, moved to states that had been
thinly populated and had tended to practice a traditionalist courthouse politics.
The migrants brought with them different values, traditions, and policy
preferences that imposed new demands on state governments. This migration,
by diversifying and enlarging the population of those states, helped to
transform their politics in various ways. Many of these states were forced to
modernize their political structures, and they developed a more competitive,
44. This fact, so obvious once one takes note of it, was pointed out to me by Professor Nelson
Polsby.
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issue-oriented politics. These political changes in the Sunbelt states exerted
reform pressures on other states, which must compete for population and tax
base. These changes, in turn, altered congressional and presidential politics and
thus the terms of the federalism debate.
The transformative social effects of television are so widely acknowledged
as to be a cliche. For my purposes, however, what is most interesting about
TV is that, despite widespread fears (or hopes) that it would standardize
popular culture and encourage a uniformity of speech and outlook, it has not
done so. This is not to deny the obvious fact that millions of American viewers
of network TV watch the same sports events and entertainment shows, hear the
same speech patterns, laugh at the same jokes, receive the same news reports,
and observe the same celebrities. Nor do I mean to deny the equally obvious
fact that much TV programming is as banal and coarse as we, its viewers,
often are.
Still, the diversity-enhancing power of this medium is at least as impressive
as its propensity toward uniformity. The notorious decline of the Big 3
networks in favor of a bewildering variety of cable channels, upstart networks,
foreign language offerings, public TV, and multimedia applications of the TV
screen has spawned extraordinarily heterogeneous programming for viewers.
Even after discounting the hype that often pervades discussion of our
telecommunications future, it seems clear that our electronic destiny is
diversity, not uniformity.45
The personal computer, along with the automobile, may prove to be the
most diversity-enhancing technology of all.46 Already, the rapid proliferation
of chat groups, home pages, World Wide Web databases, and multimedia
linkages have vastly increased the ability of users to indulge their most arcane
and specialized interests (and fantasies), from aardvarks to Zoroastrianism.
Moreover, the broad diffusion of electronic mail over the Internet and Web is
enabling individuals to conduct conversations with one another at a low and
steadily declining cost. These developments, which are certain to spread in the
years ahead, will inevitably increase individuals' choices about their (literal)
45. Communications technology is expanding diversity in other ways. Through highly specialized
advertising and targeted media, productmanufacturers and service providers can now identify and create
market niches based on ethnic, regional, gender, and other specialized appeals, and then hopefully move
into broader cross-over markets. Tortilla products, for example, began with a narrow following in some
southwestern states. By 1994, sales exceeded $2.4 billion annually; the fastest-growing market was the
Midwest. Linda Wong, Executive Director and General Counsel of Rebuilding Los Angeles, Remarks
at Immigration and World Cities conference, Columbia University (Feb. 10, 1996).
46. At least for those who can afford to gain access to it. The cost of a PC has steadily declined
even as its power and capabilities have increased. A much-discussed, frequently-predicted shake-out in
the manufacturing sector of the industry may reduce competition somewhat and slow the pace of these
pro-consumer changes, but they will probably continue nonetheless. If so, cost is unlikely to prevent
any but the most destitute of American families from affording a bottom-of-the-line PC. Utilization, of
course, is a separate question.
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connections to others and about what they wish to read, see, hear, feel, and
learn. These expanded domains of choice will in turn generate an even more
fundamental change in consciousness-in our conviction, surely exaggerated
but nonetheless deeply felt, that our identities are both controllable and readily
transformable.
Such technologies, with the social shifts that they portend, may fundamen-
tally alter the terms of the federalism debate-albeit in complex ways. The
same computer-based technologies that will enlarge individual choice can also
enable policymakers to gather, retrieve, integrate, manipulate, and analyze
immense quantities of data at relatively low cost. In the past, arguments for
central planning, industrial policy, and other national interventions in the
economy have been premised on our growing power to exploit such technolo-
gies to rationalize public policies. With such data-processing and analytical
power, the argument goes, more effective national regulation should be
possible even in the face of growing social diversity. I believe that this
argument is false, but this is beside the point, which is that computer
technologies are transforming the crucial variables that any federal system must
reflect.
One of these variables is the effect of physical location on the choices and
prospects of an individual or firm. For example, the ability to communicate
with others quickly and cheaply on a computer screen enables one to enjoy
many of the economic and cultural advantages of New York City while living
in South Dakota and enjoying its lower tax rates. More choices of this kind,
and the lower cost of gratifying them regardless of location, will greatly
complicate the Tiebout effect, in which individuals distribute themselves among
communities according to their differing preferences concerning the mix of
taxes and services offered by those communities.47
In this way (and in others), technology could exacerbate the existing
competition among jurisdictions, encouraging them to adopt beggar-thy-
neighbor policies. This would tend to accelerate the much-discussed "race to
the bottom." By freeing consumers and employers to locate anywhere at lower
opportunity costs, technology increases the pressure on high-amenity, high-tax
states like New York to reduce their regulatory and fiscal burdens in order to
retain their more mobile population, employment, and tax bases. On the other
hand, such an exodus would leave New York unable to provide those amenities
to remote consumers as well as to resident ones.4" Here, as elsewhere, a
Prisoners' Dilemma dynamic drives behavior. The would-be free-riders could
47. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofLocalExpenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
48. According to a recent report by the Regional Plan Association, in New York City-indeed, in
the New York metropolitan region as a whole-this scenario is already unfolding. Kirk Johnson, Report
Sees Major Decline for New York Region, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1996, at Al.
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defeat their own purposes, making themselves and others in the community
worse off than if they could agree on a cooperative strategy. The resulting
equilibrium might easily be sub-optimal. The conventional solution to this
problem is for the national government to adopt tax and subsidy policies that
can defuse the competition among states and localities. Most federalism theorists
emphasize this justification for an active national policy role in a federal
system,4 9 and some national policies do indeed function to keep inter-state
rivalries within tolerable limits.
But federalism, I maintain, is far more than a judicious policy response to
the risk of races to the bottom. First, it is not at all obvious that such races
would occur unless Washington supplied corrective policies. In fact, theoretical
models of the race-to-the-bottom dynamic predict a variety of possible outcomes
under a number of plausible scenarios, while the empirical data are inconclusive
as to actual outcomes.5" Beyond this indeterminacy, the risk of such a race is
more normatively ambiguous and complicated than many advocates for national
regulation suggest. These advocates emphasize the game-theoretic Prisoner's
Dilemma, yet they often overlook another economistic phenomenon that can
produce a compensating advantage: The same competitive dynamic that might
cause states to race to the bottom can also constrain the states' perverse
incentives to adopt sub-optimal spending and regulatory policies, incentives that
both public choice theory and political experience suggest are powerful indeed.
Efforts to impose national uniformity, moreover, entail their own disadvan-
tages. Uniformity mandated at the "wrong" level, or administered incompetently
even at the "right" one, may well be worse than heterogeneous outcomes among
the states. Washington's efforts to regulate inter-state competition suffer from
a variety of recurrent flaws. Its policy instruments are crude, perhaps too crude
for the necessary fine-tuning. Grants to states and localities, for example, tend
to distort those jurisdictions' own taxing and spending policies.51 Careful
administration may reduce these distortions (e.g., a maintenance of effort
requirement) but this may simply create new distortions in the process (e.g.,
locking the state into an outdated and undesirable pattern of expenditure).
Moreover, the optimal balance between federal and state preferences,
initiative, and accountability is elusive. Even where federal categorical grants
49. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Federalism and Regulation, in THE
REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEGY 111, 117-18 (George C. Eads & Michael Fit eds., 1984). See
generally PETERSON, supra note 12; Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 24.
50. Professor Klevorick's literature review makes this plain. Alvin K. Klevorick, The Race to the
Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy, in YALE LAW & POLicY
REVIEW/YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION, SYMOSIUM: CONSTRUCTING A NEW FEDERALiSM 177, 179-
81(1996).
51. Under certain conditions, such grants might even be unconstitutional. See Lynn A. Baker,
Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1916 (1995).
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to states might be justified as targeted mechanisms to internalize state-created
externalities, they tend to be policy-intrusive and administratively cumbersome.
At the same time, federal officials resist broader functional grants that
surrender policy control and funding to state officials, who may have different
political and policy priorities and whose expenditures may be more closely
disciplined by their taxpayers-voters. Washington often responds more
sluggishly than states to the changing social conditions, market forces, and
local imperatives that should inform public policy. In areas as diverse as
workfare in AFDC, managed care in Medicaid, charter schools in public
education, and more efficient forms of public utility regulation, the states and
localities are usually the first to devise new programmatic innovations, and
those innovations are often progressive.52 Finally, Congress, no less than the
states, possesses strong incentives to use national policymaking authority to
"cheat" on the federalist bargain.53 Devolution of national authority to the
states can help to limit such cheating, just as it can help to control the states'
incentives to over-spend and over-regulate.
I wish to be clear that in pointing to these deficiencies of national authority
in a federal system, I do not mean to deny that such authority can sometimes
be justified as a way to constrain socially destructive races to the bottom. My
point, rather, is that, one cannot reach a sound overall judgment about how
best to allocate policymaking and fiscal responsibilities between the two levels
of government until one analyzes many important, empirically-based factors
that militate in favor of devolution to the states.
V. THE CoGNITIvE DEMANDS OF DEVOLUTION
Broadly speaking, we may distinguish between two ways in which a federal
policymaking institution can decentralize national power. The most common
way might be called "default decentralization." Here, the federal policymaker
simply allows the power to make and implement decisions that might
constitutionally be made at the national level to remain instead where it already
is-with a lower level of government or with private actors. The other way
might be called "affirmative decentralization," in which the federal policy-
maker actively delegates-downward or outward-power that she is presently
exercising.
Most of the debate about federalism concerns the appropriateness, scope,
and terms of affirmative decentralization. In order to affirmatively decentralize
52. See, e.g., Douglas J. Besharov, The Hope of a New Approach, WASH. PosT, Dec. 3, 1995,
at Cl (describing states' recent welfare reforms). Although some state reforms are designed primarily
to save money, it is hard to explain these changes simply on the basis of that rationale. The states often
provide more benefits at greater cost than federal law requires.
53. See Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1467-81.
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power in a coherent fashion, that power must first be centralized, rationalized
(i.e., organized for delegation with certain ends in view), and then delegated.
Ordinarily, the first and third steps will not be particularly problematic; after
all, the power in question is usually centralized to a considerable degree
already, and the delegation, once arranged politically, can then be ordered into
effect.5 1 It is the intermediate step-rationalization of the power to be
delegated-that is the most difficult. To rationalize a power before delegating
it, the federal policymaker must gain a deep, nuanced, fully contextual
understanding of the policy problem to which the power is to be addressed.
Only then can the terms of the delegation be carefully and functionally tailored.
One dimension of this rationalization process is easily overlooked. I refer
to its cognitive-sympathetic aspect, by which I mean the ability of the power-
delegating institution to project itself-through an act of imaginative identifica-
tion-into the institutional mind of the lower-level delegate who must ultimately
exercise that power.
Consider, for example, the area of AFDC policy. In order to meet the
cognitive-sympathetic needs of a rationalized delegation of policymaking
authority, the federal decisionmaker-Congress, welfare bureaucracy, or
court-must be able to comprehend the decisionmaking context of local
officials who administer the program at the "retail" level. The former must
understand the nature of the latter's resource constraints, political culture,
operating routines, and ways of thinking about their tasks-all of which are
often radically different from their own. Federal policymakers must imagine
the intricate microcosmic interactions between front-line local agency
caseworkers and their clients, take into account the informal norms that those
interactions generate, and shape the ensuing delegation accordingly.
This perspectival chasm is exceedingly difficult to bridge, even under the
best of circumstances. The problem is not simply that federal delegators are
remote from the local delegates in both time and space; it is also that the two
groups inhabit quite different institutional, motivational, and hence valuational
worlds.' If we wish to improve federalism's performance, we must somehow
54. Subject, of course, to the usual implementation obstacles. These may be significant, although
not so great as when the national government seeks to centralize power that was previously
decentralized. See, e.g., MARTHA DERTHICK, AGENCY UNDER STRESS: THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1990) (discussing federalization of state programs for
support of aged, blind, and disabled into SSI).
55. One thinks of Robert Cover's famous discussion of different nomoi-words "of right and
wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and void." Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 4 (1983). For my purposes, however, the more useful typologies are Robert Merton's
distinction between cosmopolitans and parochials, James Q. Wilson's contrast of the investigatory worlds
of FBI and DEA agents, and Michael Lipsky's contrast between "street-level bureaucrats" and their
superiors at agency headquarters. See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEEL BUREAUCRACY
(1980); ROBERT MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (3d ed. 1968); JAMES Q. WILSON,
THE INVESTIGATORS: MANAGING FBI AND NARCOTICS AGENTS (1978). On the liability implications of
these differences in perspective, see PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CIVIL REMEDIES FOR
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ameliorate this problem. Whether federal agencies are permitted to retain or
enlarge their existing authority or are required to devolve it downward or
outward, they must learn to infuse lower-level values and perspectives into
their policy decisions or into their rationalization of the power to be delegated,
as the case may be.56 A number of fairly standard techniques can advance this
cognitive-sympathetic project. Examples include more extensive federal
consultations with local officials, greater regionalization of federal administra-
tion, incorporation of local norms into federal policy decisions, intergovern-
mental personnel exchanges and training that expose policymakers to conditions
and constraints in the field (and vice-versa), liberal use of waiver authorities
to encourage local policy variations and experiments, and systematic evaluation
and dissemination of their results.
CONCLUSION
As American federalism enters its third century, it exhibits a remarkable
durability and vitality. It flourishes not only because of the political inertia of
established institutional structures and vested interests (although they certainly
play their part), but because Americans remain deeply divided over public
policy issues of all kinds.57 We need political institutions that reflect these
divisions; we also need institutions that suppress and soften them. It may seem
ironic to urge that policy elites should respect the extraordinary diversity of
American society in the name of national unity, but any contradiction is only
superficial. A sound federalism must both mirror our differences and mute
them, and the precise balance that it strikes between these two national
imperatives must constantly change as our values and interests change. Today
devolution is firmly in the saddle. For the foreseeable future, American
federalism will surely accord to inter-state differences greater programmatic
scope and political legitimacy than they have enjoyed since the New Deal. Just
as surely, however, any new equilibrium will be fiercely contested and
inevitably transitory. We may safely schedule another symposium on federalism
five years hence.
OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983), especially chs. 6 and 7.
56. There is a corresponding need for local officials to learn to view themselves as part of the
national policy system, which must sometimes transcend even the most deeply-rooted parochial
differences. A more radical, institutional approach to altering the balance of national and local interests
and values would restructure representation in the U.S. Senate to include multi-state, regional, or even
national constituencies. See Peter H. Schuck, Industrial Policy's Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1983,
at A23.
57. The durability of these divisions over time, as revealed in public opinion surveys, is
remarkable. See generally BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY
YEARS OF TRENDS IN AMERICA'S POLICY PREFERENCES (1992).
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